Total institutional ownership, institutional ownership by type of institution (e.g. banks, insurance companies, mutual funds), and a new measure of ownership concentration (similar to the Herfindahl Index) are used to explain contemporaneous bid-ask spreads for 72 quarters (1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000) of NASDAQtraded stocks. When controlling for a number of commonly-used variables, relative bid-ask spreads are found to be significantly negatively related to the level of institutional ownership and significantly positively related to the concentration of ownership. The results are consistent with expectations of market perception of information asymmetry. The impact of ownership by type of institution and concentration within each type of institution on bid-ask spreads and future returns vary between five major groups of institutional investors. These differences are explained by alternative investment goals and strategies, and by regulatory factors.
Introduction
characteristics as predictor variables for the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread is determined primarily by dealers' holding costs, competition, and risks. He explains that informed trading and volatility are the main factors influencing dealers' risk. Stoll (1978) finds that relative spreads are negatively related to price and positively related to risk and variance. Decreasing per-share holding and transaction costs and high absolute prices reduce dealers' costs and produce a negative effect on absolute spreads. At the same time, high prices inflate the total value of 100-share lots and, as a result, decrease the average number of shares per trade, increasing the total number of trades. In that respect, high share prices generate a positive impact on bid-ask spreads. Most research provides evidence that high prices lead to lower relative spreads.
It has been shown by some researchers that a price change by itself causes a change in the bid-ask spread. Copeland (1979) and Conroy et al. (1990) suggest that stock splits increase relative bid-ask spreads and return volatility. Ohlson and Penman (1985) provide evidence that the volatility of returns and relative spreads increase after stock splits. Conroy et al. (1990) report that relative spreads increase for NYSE-traded stocks after stock splits. The authors suggest such increases represent a liquidity cost of stock splits and partly explain the volatility of returns after splits.
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Previous research documents a consistent positive relationship between return volatility and bidask spread (e.i., Benston and Hagerman (1974) , Barea and Logue (1975) , Stoll (1978) , Hamilton (1978) , Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) , Kini and Mian (1995) , Kothare and Laux (1995) , Jennings, Schnatterly, and Seguin (2001) ). Substantial price swings may require market makers to keep larger inventory on hand and therefore may increase dealer's holding costs. If price volatility is caused by trades initiated by large institutions, which are often perceived as informed investors, then dealers may face additional information asymmetry risk. In fact, Sias (1996) documented a positive relationship between return volatility and institutional ownership. Hence, a control for the standard deviation of returns would be necessary for a study focusing on bid-ask spread and ownership structure. This study employs the standard deviation of daily returns computed over each quarter as a control variable. notes that the bid-ask spread is one of the most often used measures of liquidity because it can be easily obtained and interpreted. One of the arguments against employing bidask spreads to measure liquidity is that the posted prices are relevant only for small orders. Large trades that occur both inside and outside of the posted quotes may not be reflected in the bid-ask spread. Even if the quoted bid and ask depth is rather small, it is indicative of the overall supply and demand around the best-quoted prices. One can argue that with lower spreads, large trades will deviate less from the fair value price (an average of the bid and ask quotes). At the same time, if the best-quoted bid and ask prices are too far apart, then the next best offer will be even further away from the bid and ask average. While the above argument is certainly worth investigating, bid-ask spreads still provide valuable information about the ability of both small and large investors to execute their orders at more favorable prices. Table 1 summarizes previous literature on the relationship between the bid-ask spread and other, mainly liquidity-related, characteristics.
Volume
One of the important liquidity-related characteristics of securities is trading volume. Most research suggests that higher volume leads to a lower bid-ask spread. This hypothesis is based on the idea that per-share order processing costs and holding costs are lower for high volume stocks. This assumption ignores the fact that higher volume securities are likely to have more market makers.
Additionally, lower priced stocks are likely to have higher trading volume. At the same time, low priced stocks have relatively larger bid-ask spreads. Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara, and Paperman (1996) provide empirical evidence for a sample of NYSE-listed stocks that supports the hypothesis that the probability of informed trading is lower for high volume stocks. However, volume should be used with other variables, controlling for average trade size, number of trades, and number of market makers. Tkac (1999) examines excess turnover versus a benchmark (security specific average trading volume adjusted for market-wide volume measures) and concludes that excess turnover is positively related to institutional ownership and negatively related to firm size.
The research findings on spreads, volume and other liquidity-related characteristics are highly inconsistent. Demsetz (1968) , Tinic (1972) , Tinic and West (1972) , and Hamilton (1978) found that 5 spreads are positively correlated with price. Branch and Freed (1977) and Stoll (1978) document that spreads are negatively related to price. Demsetz (1968) , Tinic (1972) , Tinic and West (1972) , Branch and Freed (1977) , and Stoll (1978) found a negative relationship between bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Tinic (1972) , Hamilton (1978) , Barnea and Logue (1975) , report that spreads are negatively related to institutional ownership. Barnea and Logue (1975) and Stoll (1978) found that spreads are positively related to price variance. Hamilton (1978) , however, also found that spreads are positively related to price and volatility, and negatively related to the number of shareholders and institutional ownership. Stoll (1978) reports that spreads are also negatively related to the number of dealers in the security.
What is more important for investors is the fact that they cannot benefit directly from the high volume per se. An increase in volume should lead to better execution prices. If it does, then this effect will be reflected in a lower bid-ask spread.
Concentration
Institutional ownership should also be examined in terms of concentration of shares owned by the largest shareholders. Securities with highly-concentrated ownership are likely to exhibit different characteristics than are securities with dispersed ownership. Gompers and Metrick (2001) argue that higher concentration contributes to higher liquidity and "increased frequency of large shareholder activism." Heflin and Shaw (2000) , on the other hand, show that firms with a greater percentage of shares owned by blockholders have lower liquidity expressed in larger quoted spreads, larger effective spreads, larger adverse selection components of spreads, and less quote depth. Bhide (1993) and Roe (1994) suggest that greater liquidity reduces the desire of large shareholders to pursue active monitoring of the company's management and, therefore, reduces large shareholders' desire to accumulate large blocks of stock. Bhide argues that greater liquidity provides for a less costly exit by large shareholders and reduces their incentives to monitor. At the same time, Maug (1998) provides a model in which liquidity is positively related to concentrated ownership. He argues that greater liquidity allows for accumulating large blocks of shares based on private information without revealing this information. Thus there appears to be no consensus in the literature regarding the effects of concentration of ownership on liquidity.
Most researchers examining concentration of ownership in equity studies use the percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders as the measure of concentration. This study employs a different measure as a proxy for concentration -the Herfindahl Index. This index provides researchers with a tool to account for each institutional holding individually (e.g., each pension fund) and the size of each holding. The Herfindahl Index can provide a better picture of the true levels of concentration in institutional ownership of a particular company. Consider two companies. At Company A, 75% of all shares outstanding are held by institution X, the rest of the shares (25%) are dispersed between small institutional and individual investors. At Company B, the top five owners each own 15% of the shares, the rest of the shares (25%) are dispersed between small institutional and individual investors. If "percent of holdings owned by the top five shareholders" is used as a proxy for concentration, then the ownership structure of Company A and Company B will be misrepresented. Both companies have almost the same percentage of shares held by the top five shareholders (Company A has a slightly higher percentage of shares held by top five shareholders, than company B). Company A, however, has 75% of its shares controlled by a single owner. The Herfindahl Index accounts for every institutional owner and distinguishes between companies with different concentrations of ownership.
The Herfindahl Index, which is often referred to in the financial literature as "Focus," has been employed to measure the level of focus of firms' businesses. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1995) used the Herfindahl Index to measure the relationship between a firm's focus, or specialization, and stock returns. Woerheide and Persson (1993) evaluated different measures of diversification of securities portfolios. They conclude that the Herfindahl Index was the best of the five measures of diversification considered, as it provided the highest explanatory power.
Performance, Preferences and Herding
Having access to alternative sources and different types of information, institutional investors can identify and choose securities that meet their preferences and goals. Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual funds have a significant preference toward stocks with high visibility of earnings and low transaction costs. Falkenstein's results show a positive relationship between the standard deviation of returns and ownership by mutual funds, but a negative relationship between mutual fund ownership and variance of security returns. Falkenstein's findings suggest that mutual fund managers either prefer volatile stocks to achieve better returns relative to major market indices, or they believe in their ability to select "better stocks" which can provide abnormal returns with low systematic risk. Bogle and Twardowski (1980) found that mutual funds have consistently earned higher returns than other types of institutional investors except for the period of a major bear market in 1970-1974, when their performance was almost identical to that of the other three categories of institutional investors. The authors also showed that pension funds failed to yield returns higher than mutual funds for any time frame during the period of study. In the same vein, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Del Guercio (1996) suggest that bank and pension fund managers' preference toward "glamour stocks" may explain the difference of their portfolio performance relative to that of mutual funds.
According to Falkenstein (1996) , Morningstar Investment Survey shows that in December 1992, 37.5 percent of mutual funds stated "growth" as their investment objective. Additionally, 28.7 percent of the funds were growth-income funds and 2.5 percent were aggressive growth funds. Aggressive growth, growth, and growth-income funds represent 68.5 percent of all mutual funds. Only 4.9 percent of the funds reported their objective as equity-income and 3.3 percent called themselves balanced funds. These data suggests that most mutual funds are rather aggressive in their investment strategies.
Mutual funds and independent investment advisors are likely to differ from other three types of institutions in their trading patterns and investment styles. Their ownership may, therefore, result in different perception of information asymmetry and various impacts on liquidity. Del Guercio (1996) shows that unlike mutual funds, both bank trusts and bank managed pension funds prefer that their investments be considered by courts to be "prudent." She proposes that these differences may explain relative underperformance by bank trusts and bank pension funds. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that pension fund managers do not pursue potentially destabilizing herding and positive-feedback trading practices. Mutual fund managers may be pressured by their incentives (i.e., Sirri and Tufano, 1993) and may be less bound by fiduciary limitations on their investment portfolios, and therefore might tend to undertake riskier and/or momentum investment strategies to improve relative performance. It has been shown by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) that mutual funds tend to purchase stocks based on their past returns. In fact, the authors report that 77 percent of mutual funds have been found to be momentum traders. If mutual fund managers rely mostly on widely available public information and are less likely to exercise additional thorough monitoring than other types of institutional investors (e.g., index fund managers), their contribution to information asymmetry may be the least significant.
Mutual fund managers' preferences towards higher volatility stocks (Falkenstein, 1996) may suggest that they are more likely to trade out of their positions during down markets and reacquire their investments when the market turns -it is easy to outperform a down market by being less than fully invested, but managers may be punished for missing a major upturn. If market participants believe that some trading by mutual funds is not based on information asymmetry, but is rather caused by the positive feedback trading, herding, market timing or asset allocation, then such trading may generate additional liquidity without creating a perception of information asymmetry. If most of the market makers do not consider such institutions as informed investors, then they are not likely to increase their spreads even if an institution is in fact an informed investor. Thus, mutual fund participation may increase market liquidity without additional risk for the market maker, thereby decreasing spreads. 8 Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that the riskiness of mutual fund individual holdings depends on the performance incentives for managers and on the fund's year-to-date returns. The authors provide evidence that supports a hypothesis that mutual fund managers alter the riskiness of their portfolios at the end of the year and these portfolio changes can be explained by performance incentives and year-to-date performance. Performance pressure may encourage mutual funds to follow trends in the market. Market timing could force mutual fund managers to reduce or eliminate long positions during periods of negative returns and to increase their overall holdings in a bull market. Consequently, mutual fund managers are likely to be less involved in monitoring their long-term investments than other types of large blockholders. In fact, Falkenstein (1996) shows that equity mutual fund managers prefer stocks with more public information as measured by the number of newspaper articles mentioning the companies.
Unclassified institutional investors, which are grouped together with endowments in the CDA Spectrum database, differ from all other types of institutional owners. According to Bhide (2000) nonfinancial corporations acquire large positions in other companies mainly for the purposes of business alliances, joint ventures, and takeovers. Obviously, nonfinancial corporations and other institutional owners will have different effects on liquidity. They are more likely to possess an information advantage and to trade less frequently than other institutions, especially mutual funds.
Herding behavior or trend following by institutions has been examined in a number of studies (i.e., Vishny (1991, 1992) , Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Nofsinger and ). Herding refers to any mass buying or selling of a particular asset. Trend following is a specific form of herding, when a particular asset, which has recently risen in price, is "chased" or bid-up by institutions. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) suggest that pension fund managers do not strongly pursue these "potentially destabilizing practices."
It should be noted that a high level of institutional trading might be associated with greater volatility (e.g., Seely, 1985) . Potter (1992) argues that there is positive correlation between price volatility and institutional ownership around earnings announcements. If institutional ownership has an impact on volatility, then such a relationship would be particularly evident during periods of herding. Sias (1996) documents a positive relationship between institutional ownership and volatility of returns.
He presents results that support a hypothesis that an increase in institutional holdings results in greater volatility.
Herding is likely to increase the liquidity and volatility of underlying assets. Schulman (1992) shows that a "dramatic reduction in institutional commission costs" has led to substantial growth in both the number and size of institutional trades. The impact of institutional trading can lead to higher or lower liquidity and may result in wider or narrower spreads.
Because various types of institutions have alternative reasons for being in the market, diverse trading and investment strategies, and a range of preferences toward their portfolios and the individual securities comprising them, they have different impacts on information asymmetry, returns, and liquidity.
It is important to separate institutional owners by type of institutions in order to identify these impacts for each type of institutions. Such differences, which have been largely overlooked in financial literature, may present valuable information for academia and investors.
Fiduciary Responsibilities, Regulations and Prudence
Del Guercio also shows that both bank trusts and bank managed pension funds tilt their portfolios 9 towards high quality or "prudent" stocks. Additionally, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that pension fund managers do not strongly pursue potentially destabilizing practices of herding or positive feedback trading. This is another evidence that all institutions are not the same.
All institutional investors are responsible for their investment decisions. Endowment managers generally are not rewarded for good returns, but are penalized for bad performance. Mutual funds are the most diverse of all types of institutions and, at the same time, appear to be the least restricted group of institutional investors. All mutual funds (growth, value, balanced, international, sector) are governed by the SEC in accordance with the Investment Company Act of 1940, which makes no reference to "prudent investments." Longstreth (1986) shows that 63 percent of bank investment managers reported that law precluded investment opportunities that they would have otherwise pursued. The American Bankers Association's "Model Prudent Man Investment Act" and the American Law Institute's "Restatement of Trusts," preclude investment in "speculative shares of stock," "new and untried enterprises," "unseasoned securities," and margin trading (Scott, 1959) .
In addition to the general "prudent man" rules, each group of institutional investors is governed by additional rules pertaining to that particular type of institution. Insurance companies, for example, are regulated by state legislatures, state insurance commissioners and state insurance departments. Private pension plans are governed by the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) and subsequent pension legislation. Passed in 1974, ERISA is believed to be one of the primary causes for the growth of private pension fund investments.
According to ERISA, private pension plan managers are personally liable for breaches of fiduciary responsibility. Krikorian (1989) states that public pension plan managers are liable to the same degree as bank trust managers, they are also legally constrained in their investment strategies and trading patterns. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) show that pension funds invest mostly in large capitalization stocks: the bottom 50 percent of stocks in terms of size represent only 1.4 percent of pension funds' equity holdings. Monitoring large companies is much easier and less costly than monitoring small companies. Being constrained to "prudent investments" and being liable for their decisions; banks, pension funds and insurance companies exercise more caution and are more motivated to monitor their investments. Such monitoring may lead to information asymmetry between "constrained managers" and other market participants.
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While several researches have tried to examine the relationship between bid-ask spreads and institutional ownership (i.e., Kini and Mian (1995) , and Jennings, Schnatterly, and Seguin (2001) ), none of the studies have employed a sample of cross-sectional and/or time-series observations as broad as the sample used for this study. Furthermore, no institutional ownership study has used the Herfindahl index to measure the level of institutional concentration of ownership. This study provides a comprehensive investigation of institutional ownership, its structure, returns, and bid-ask spreads on NASDAQ stocks, while controlling for other liquidity-related variables, such as number of market makers, trading volume, price, number of trades, and number of shares outstanding.
Hypotheses Development
There are arguments and evidence for both a positive and a negative relationship between institutional ownership and the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. If institutional ownership generates information asymmetry, then spreads become wider and improve the dealers' risk-reward ratio. If institutional presence improves information dissemination and generates additional interest in a security, then spreads should be lower. provide evidence that institutional trading is based on information and stimulates the speed of adjustment to that information.
This study suggests that with control for concentration of ownership, additional liquidity provided by dispersed institutional owners has stronger effects on lowering spreads than the effects of information asymmetry has on widening spreads. The net impact of institutional participation on liquidity depends on the extent to which institutions are informed. Concentrated ownership allows for more information asymmetry. Therefore, the effects of concentrated ownership on spreads will be negatively correlated with the effects of overall institutional ownership. Concentrated ownership is likely to widen spreads, while high institutional and dispersed ownership will provide more liquidity and thereby will lower the corresponding spreads.
The above arguments motivate the first hypothesis to be tested in this study:
Hypothesis #1: The percentage of shares of NASDAQ-traded common stocks held by institutional owners is negatively related to the relative bid-ask spread of these stocks. (The coefficients of the proportion of total institutional ownership (TIO) in regressions of spread on different predictor variables will be negative.
This hypothesis is based on the argument that institutional participation stimulates information dissemination and increases interest in the underlying security. Additional interest in the stock is likely to generate extra trading volume, attract additional investors and may eventually lead to an increase in the number of market makers. In order to differentiate between impacts of institutional and individual trades and to account for a per-share component of market makers' costs, the number of trades and trading volume measures are used as separate predictor variables (i.e., Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1993) ). The research question addressed by the first hypothesis was approached in some of the existing literature, however, it has not been investigated while controlling for the level of concentration of ownership.
It can be expected that alternative types of institutional owners may have different impacts on liquidity. Pension funds, endowments and bank trust managers, for example, are likely to exercise more monitoring of the "prudence" of their investments which they own for longer periods and trade less often.
Mutual fund managers, on the contrary, tend to trade more often, trying to improve their relative returns.
Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2001) document that average correlation between turnover (monthly trading volume to number of shares outstanding) and ownership by banks is almost five times smaller than the correlation between turnover and shares held by independent investment advisors, three and a half times smaller than the correlation between turnover and mutual fund ownership and 50 percent less than correlation with insurance companies and other institutional investors.
The fifth category of institutional investors is unclassified "others" and comprised mostly of university and foundation endowments. As discussed above, endowments pursue less risky investment strategies than mutual funds. Brown (1999) provides evidence that university endowments exhibit considerably less variance of returns than major market indices. While Brown documents considerable variation in performance and holdings across the range of university endowment funds, he shows that most endowments are similar in that they undertake considerably lower amounts of risk. The high risk aversion of endowment managers can be explained by agency costs, and the nature of university obligations. Universities have lower tolerance for variations in performance and university trustees are not financially motivated to improve endowment returns. Poor performance of an endowment portfolio, on the other hand, may lead to significant problems for endowment managers, which comprise the majority of the fifth category of the institutional investors. Participation of these types of investors is likely to have a negative impact on liquidity due to information asymmetry. To separate the effects of different types of owners, we should analyze ownership by type of institution.
As discussed above, mutual funds and independent investment advisors are likely to trade more often and exercise less monitoring. As a consequence, they might provide greater liquidity and less information asymmetry than banks, insurance companies, and other institutions. These arguments provide the foundation for the test of the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis #2: The effect of the percentage of ownership by investment companies and independent investment advisors (categories 3 and 4 of institutional investors) on bid-ask spreads of NASDAQ-traded stocks will be negative and more significant than the effect produced by banks, insurance companies, and other types of owners (categories 1, 2, and 5 of institutional owners).
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Monitoring by larger institutional shareholders may stimulate accumulation of asymmetric information, which may translate into wider spreads. Institutions with smaller holdings, however, may rely more on public information and, therefore, their trading may not lead to wider spreads, but may increase liquidity of the underlying asset. Falkenstein (1996) argues that institutions behave "less like insiders and more like general public" in their trading patterns. Mutual funds rely mostly on publicly available information and represent less information asymmetry risk for market-makers. Pension funds, on the other hand, are likely to monitor more closely, participate in corporate governance and intervene.
The degree of their shareholder activism can be explained by alternative investment strategies (i.e., Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) ). Separating different types of institutional investors in regression models and measuring the level of their concentration may provide a better explanation of bid-ask spreads.
Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2001) suggest that over time, institutional investors have changed their preferences toward smaller and more risky securities, where they can receive more benefits from their informational advantage. Therefore, institutional trading in large companies with extensive analyst coverage contains less information asymmetry. In fact, the small-firm effect may actually be an asymmetric-information effect if small stock prices contain discounts for the information asymmetry risk and relatively lower liquidity.
Considerations discussed above suggest that it is necessary to control for concentration of 
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The third hypothesis is based on the argument that owners with larger positions may be more informed and therefore, information asymmetry may be present in the market for the underlying security.
In fact, Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) conclude that dealers do not consider institutions to be informed traders. According to Bhide (1993) active stockholders reduce agency costs by providing internal monitoring, but at the same time, reduce stock liquidity by stimulating information asymmetry. Bhide goes further to argue that higher liquidity "discourages internal monitoring by reducing the costs of "exit" of unhappy stockholders." These arguments suggest that stocks with concentrated positions will have more information asymmetry and less liquidity.
As discussed earlier, concentration of ownership by different types of institutions is likely to have various impacts on bid-ask spreads.
Hypothesis #4: The effect of the concentration of ownership by investment companies and independent investment advisors (categories 3 and 4 of institutional investors) on bid-ask spreads of NASDAQ-traded stocks will be positive and more significant than the effect produced by banks, insurance companies, and other types of owners (categories 1, 2, and 5 of institutional owners).
The second and fourth hypotheses are based on the arguments that mutual fund managers trade more often, chasing better relative returns, while exercising less monitoring of the quality of their investments than other participants. Being restricted by their investment guidelines, goals and regulations; banks, insurance companies, endowment and pension fund managers will exercise more monitoring and trade less actively. Therefore, their positive impact on liquidity will be less pronounced due to less frequent trading and is likely to be offset by the negative impact of information asymmetry.
A restricted institutional investor (e.g., bank trust, pension fund, insurance company or foundation) has to rely on publicly available information to "justify the prudence" of their investments.
An accumulation of a large position by an unrestricted investor (e.g., mutual fund or independent investment advisor) on the other hand, may signal that an institution possesses some information advantage. Mutual fund investments are less likely to be made for prudence considerations only, but would rather be based on the institutional belief that a security is underpriced. With less oversight from regulators and clientele, mutual funds and independent investment advisors do not have to reveal the sources of their information and therefore may capitalize on an information advantage. Therefore, concentration of ownership by mutual funds and independent investment advisors is a more robust signal of information asymmetry, than that of banks, insurance companies and foundations.
14 Trades of informed investors should contribute to information asymmetry and therefore may widen spreads. Trades of uninformed investors should contribute to liquidity without additional information asymmetry. Separating volume generated by owners with large positions from volume generated by minor institutional owners and volume generated by individual investors may yield additional information about information asymmetry.
Institutional owners are first sorted in two groups. A group of "large" owners consists of institutions with positions of at least one percent of the shares outstanding. A group of "small" institutional owners is comprised of the rest of the institutions. Using one percent instead of the usual five percent allows for inclusion of those institutions which may be avoiding costly reporting requirements and do not want to be identified as blockholders.
Net change in shares owned is calculated for each institution and the absolute value of the change in shares held is added for each of the institutional groups. The difference between total volume for the quarter and volume of large institutional owners, Vol large , and smaller institutional owners, Vol small , is used as a proxy for the trading volume generated by individuals, Vol ind . Individual volume, Vol ind , also captures volume which is offset by buying and selling by the reporting institution within the reported quarter. This separation is possible because NASDAQ volume was double counted until 2001.
Three volume variables will be included in regressions instead of an average volume variable.
The total trading volume is included in separate regression estimates. 1997. This decline can be explained by mergers and consolidation in the banking industry. Banks' equity investments can be expected to grow in light of the legislation enacted in 1999 easing regulation of bank investment activities. The number of institutional managers classified as independent investment advisors skyrocketed during the same period. In 1997, there were almost six times more independent investment advisors than there were in 1983 (1,128 vs. 195) . Because institutions are likely to avoid holding more than 5% of the total shares outstanding due to costly reporting requirements, institutional ownership of small capitalization stocks may be under -reported in the CDA Spectrum database of 13F filings.
The CRSP tapes provide closing bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ traded stocks. Average spread provides a more accurate representation of real spreads during the quarter. The average spread is a simple arithmetic average of all daily closing spreads during the quarter.
Closing spreads on NASDAQ stocks can serve as good proxies for average intraday spreads. The behavior of NASDAQ spreads is different from NYSE spreads that have been shown to behave in a Ushaped intraday pattern (e.g., Wei (1992) , Chung, Van Neese, Van Neese (1999) ). Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) found that NASDAQ spreads, unlike NYSE spreads, do not widen near the close of the market. On the contrary, they are rather stable throughout the day and narrow at the close. McInish and Wood (1992) provide evidence that NASDAQ spreads behave in a reverse J-shape pattern: spreads are wide at the beginning of the day, gradually narrowing through the day and slightly widening at the close.
In either case, all of the above authors document that closing spreads for NASDAQ stocks are not significantly different from the average intraday spreads.
Seventy-two quarters of recorded ownership data were employed in the study starting with March 1983 and ending in December 2000. The first quarter of 1983 contains information for 4,639 securities.
A total of 2,344 (50%) of these securities are NASDAQ stocks. The last quarter of 1997 contains data for 10,720 securities, with 7,124 of these being NASDAQ stocks (66.5%).
The number of shares outstanding is provided both in the CDA-Spectrum and CRSP database.
Price is identified as the average of the bid and ask prices. Average trading volume, number of market makers, and number of trades are provided by CRSP as well.
16
Market microstructure literature identifies four major components of the bid-ask spread: order processing costs, dealers' holding costs, information asymmetry risk premium, and level of dealers' competition (i.e., Stoll (1978) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , Copeland and Galai (1983) ). The order processing component of the bid-ask spread can be captured by number of trades, trading volume, and share price. Number of market makers is a direct measure of the degree of dealer's competition. The
Herfindahl Index, a measure of concentration of ownership, represents a proxy for information asymmetry risk along with trading volume and number of trades.
Methodology
Closing daily bid and ask prices are obtained from the CRSP database. The daily relative spread is computed for each asset. The daily spread, S, for security j is defined as:
To obtain a better estimate of the relative spread, an average spread is computed for each asset for each quarter. Daily price is an average of the daily bid and ask prices for each security. 
An average quarterly price is computed by averaging daily prices. n is the number of recorded closing prices in a quarter, q.
Daily number of trades (NumTrades) is obtained from the CRSP database and averaged through the quarter. Total quarterly trading volume is also obtained from CRSP. Kothare and Laux (1995) used average trade size to measure the impact of large trades on spreads. McInish and Wood (1992) found that number of trades and number of shares per trade are significantly negatively related to relative spreads.
Number of trades and volume provide better explanatory power than average trade size. In this study we employ number of trades along with control for volume to separate the effects of overall volume from different sizes of trades. Stoll (1978) used the ratio of volume to the total number of shares outstanding to estimate the effect of informed trading. This approach, however, will not provide a proxy for a per share component of dealer costs. Also, with quarterly data volume spikes will be diluted by other trading days during the quarter. Used along with volume, number of trades will serve to clarify the effect of the trades placed by large shareholders.
Total trading volume is decomposed into three variables. VolLarge -volume generated by The proportion of total institutional ownership (TIO jt ) can be calculated by dividing the total institutional ownership of shares by the total number of shares outstanding for each stock j, and each quarter t. Table 2 summarizes the data for all variables for the time period analyzed (72 quarters).
Results
Observations with missing bid or ask prices were deleted from all datasets, which resulted in a maximum number of 250,663 observations. Some variables were calculated over a period of the previous twenty quarters (standard deviation and variance of the return on equity), some variables were calculated over past quarter and preceding three quarters (momentums of past returns) and some over the future one, four, (December 1990), followed the major market decline of the second half of 1990. Another visible local high for spreads was in quarter #58 (June 1997), which was a rather volatile period for the market. The last spike occurred in the last quarter of 1998, which included a significant decline in November of that year. Spreads were also steadily rising during 2000 -a major bear market with declining trading volume.
The only increase in spreads which did not coincide or follow a major market decline occurred in quarter # 38 (June 1992) and was followed by the high level of spreads in the next quarter (#39). Bid-ask spreads at that time were the highest for the period of this study (11.55% and 11.50%). The high spreads coincided with low and rapidly declining trading volume and a major decline in total institutional ownership. Institutional ownership dropped from almost 25% in the first quarter of 1992 to slightly above 18% in the second quarter of the same year and below 18% in the following quarter (see Figure 2 ). While this pattern supports the main hypotheses suggested in this research, it must be noted that valid sample increased from 2,674 to 4,002 during the second quarter of 1992. Hence, the changes may be caused by the addition of most-likely more volatile small capitalization stocks.
Market sentiment in the second quarter of 1992 resembled that of early 2002. The economy had come out of the recession, but uncertainty still prevailed in the market place. Investors were hesitant to make long-term investments and were worried about future economic prospects and corporate earnings.
Uncertainty creates a perception of information asymmetry, which is expressed in wider spreads.
Descriptive Statistics: Institutional Ownership
The overall average for institutional ownership is 21.11% with a high of almost 100% of the total number of shares outstanding. The long-term trend shows a steady increase in total institutional ownership ( Figure 2 ). The only major decline in total institutional ownership (except for a low observation sample in the first three quarters) happened in quarter # 38 (June 1992) followed by a smaller decline in the following quarter. The decline in institutional ownership was accompanied by low and falling trading volume and a jump in bid-ask spreads. While the relationship may directly support the proposition developed earlier in this study that high levels of total institutional ownership increase liquidity, reduce information asymmetry and lead to lower spreads, the relationship may be explained by 22 the substantial increase in sample size during the second quarter of 1992. A jump in valid observations may have been caused by the addition of smaller, riskier stocks to CRSP files.
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The percent of shares owned by banks has been declining during the period of study. The overall average is 3.57%, which declined from about 4.5% to 5.5% in the 1980s to about 2.6 to 4.6% in the 1990s. During the last two years (1999) (2000) , the percent of shares owned by banks decreased to about 2.6%. Insurance companies owned about the same fraction of shares over the period of study with an average of 1.3%.
In contrast to insurance companies and banks, investment companies ( However, estimates of both are not significant under the 2SLS (p-value for HST and VolLarge is 60% and 61% respectively). An OLS estimate of HST on the other hand is significant at the 10% level with pvalue of 6.4%. It is reasonable to expect slightly different values for a variable, which is replaced with its estimated value. Table 4 summarizes results of Hausman specification tests. 6 The first number in each column reports the fraction of 70 Hausman specification tests in which the 2SLS method is preferred to OLS.
The second number in each column shows the fraction of tests that failed to show that preference.
Overall, 35% of cross-sectional regressions are better specified with an instrumental variable approach.
From all quarters, 65% of tests failed to show preference of 2SLS over more powerful OLS regression. 6 The test statistics, m, is calculated as q' (V 1 -V 0 ) -1 q where V 1 and V 0 represent consistent estimates of the asymptotic covariance matrices of β 1 and β 0 , and q = β 1 -β 0 . Under the null hypothesis both β 1 and β 0 are consistent, but only β 0 is asymptotically efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, only β 1 is consistent. The statistic is distributed as a Chi-square with k degrees of freedom, where k represents the rank of the matrix (V 1 -V 0 ).
Even though the results do not provide sufficient proof that size of the spreads influences level and concentration of ownership, this question deserves further attention and should be a subject of future research. All other estimations in this study are based on a more powerful, and less sensitive to specification errors, OLS approach.
Relationship between Bid-Ask Spreads and the Structure of Institutional Ownership
The main subject of the following analysis is the impact of different institutional owners and their concentration on the bid-ask spread. From the discussion presented earlier in the study, one can expect that high levels of institutional ownership inject additional liquidity in underlying securities, and therefore decrease the bid-ask spread. This proposition is tested along with the hypothesis that different types of institutional owners will produce impacts of alternative magnitudes. To test the latter proposition, differences between parameter estimates from standardized regressions are examined in this section.
It was expected that concentration of ownership would have a widening impact on spreads.
Again, the size of the impact was expected to differ between various types of institutions. Seventy-two cross sectional regressions were estimated for each model. For each quarter, all variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to allow for comparison between different types of institutions.
Total Institutional Ownership (Test of Hypothesis # 1)
Total institutional ownership was defined earlier in the study as the fraction of shares outstanding owned by all institutional investors reporting their holdings in quarterly form 13F. This measure of institutional participation in ownership is the one that has been addressed in the literature and is often mislabeled as concentration of ownership. Though there is no consensus about the direction of its impact on the bid-ask spread, it was expected in this study that percentage of total institutional ownership will be negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread (see Hypothesis #1). Seventy-two cross-sectional standardized and raw regressions were performed for each of the estimation models. Tables 6 and 7 display averages of each parameter calculated over 72 quarters, the standard deviation of the resulting time-series of estimates, the fraction of positive and negative parameter estimates, and the fractions of positive and negative parameter estimates significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Table 6 The average coefficient of total institutional ownership in the standardized regressions is -0.08899. Again, 93% of parameter estimates are negative and significant at the 1% level, 1% are negative and significant at the 5% level, and 3% are negative and significant at the 10% level. This estimate is the third largest negative average coefficient with only the number of market makers (-0.32066 ) and the number of trades (-0.09635) larger. This variable is more important in lowering spreads than price (-0.07310). Table 7 provide results of the estimation of the third model. Here, instead of the aggregate concentration of ownership, five concentration measures -one for each type of institution -are employed.
The resulting R-squares and adjusted R-squares are even higher than in previous model (67.89% for Rsquare and 67.66% for the adjusted R-square), which is consistent with the hypothesis that the type of institution does matter in explaining bid-ask spreads. Adding five concentration measures resulted in a more powerful estimation despite the fact that all five Herfindahl Indexes are highly correlated with each other. Total institutional ownership here, as in the previous model, has a significant negative impact on spreads with an average value of the coefficient estimates of -0.08970 for standardized regression and -0.02371 for the raw regression. Almost all of the estimates are significant at 1% level.
All of the results are consistent with expectations of this study and support Hypothesis #1. High levels of total institutional ownership clearly generate additional liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread, and provide for better execution prices for all market participants, other than market makers.
Institutional Ownership by Type of Institution (Tests of Hypothesis # 2)
The following estimations are similar to the models discussed in the previous section, but total institutional ownership is replaced with the fraction of shares owned by each of the five groups of institutions: banks, insurance companies, investment companies, independent investment advisors, and other. The results are similar to that of the total institutional ownership. Hypothesis #2 stated that the percent of shares owned by investment companies and independent investment advisors would be negatively related to bid-ask spreads and that the magnitudes of the effects produced by these two institutional groups would be stronger than that of banks, insurance companies and unclassified institutions. Table 8 Table 9 . Even though all of the variables have a negative impact on spreads, as discussed above, some of them are significantly more powerful than others. Independent investment advisors, for example, contribute significantly more to lowering spreads, than do banks. The average value of all 72 differences between banks and independent investment advisors is 0.0606 with a T-value of 11.52. This finding indicates that independent investment advisors, on average, are more powerful creators of liquidity, than banks are. While the ownership by independent investment advisors is strongly related to future quarterly and yearly returns, market makers apparently do not perceive them as informed investors presenting information asymmetry or illiquidity risks. Independent investment advisors also generate about eight times more trading volume and turnover positions approximately 2.5 times more often than banks. Greater volume and more frequent trading decreases market makers order processing and holding costs and reduces a per share amount of the information asymmetry risk premium. (Table 9) one can see that independent investment advisors have a much more powerful narrowing effect on spreads than the other four groups. Differences between coefficients for independent investment advisors and all other groups of institutions are significant at the 1% level.
Pairwise tests between the remaining four types of institutions do not produce statistically significant evidence of one being more powerful than the other. Therefore, independent investment advisors -the largest group of all institutions -can be singled out from all institutional investors. As discussed earlier, one might expect independent investment advisors to exercise less monitoring and act on publiclyavailable information. Independent investment advisors may be less concerned with prudence of their investments (being less bound by regulations, than, say, bank trust departments and pension funds) and may be induced to invest mostly for short-term performance.
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Investment companies have the second largest negative impact on spreads, but results of the pairwise tests are not as powerful as those for independent investment advisors. All institutions can be ranked in the following order based on their contribution to narrowing spreads: (1) independent investment advisors; (2) investment companies; (3) insurance companies; (4) banks; and (5) "other."
Concentration of Total Institutional Ownership (Tests of Hypothesis # 3)
The impact of the concentration of total institutional ownership on bid-ask spread was examined with the first and third regression model. Hypotheses # 3 proposed that concentration of total institutional ownership is positively related to bid-ask spreads. The test results are summarized in Tables 6 and 8 
Concentration of Ownership by Type of Institution (Tests of Hypotheses # 4)
To further investigate the effects of different types of institutions on spreads, a concentration measure is divided into five Herfindahl Indices, one for each type of institutional owner. Hypothesis # 4 proposes that concentration of ownership by investment companies and independent investment advisors are positively and more significantly related to bid-ask spreads, than concentration of ownership by banks, insurance companies and unclassified institutions. As in the case with total institutional ownership, resulting R-squares and adjusted R-squares are slightly higher (67.89% and 66.66% respectively) than for the models with one measure of concentration, HST.
As expected, all coefficients have positive averages, but there is a significant variance in their size. Fifty one percent of HSBanks estimates are significant at the 10% level or better, 31% of HSInv estimates are significant at the same level, 26% of HSIndep are significant at the 10% level, and only 8% of HSOther and 7% of HSIns are significant at the same level.
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By taking differences for all pairs of coefficients from 72 standardized regressions, one can further determine the relative importance of each variable. Table 35 summarizes results of pairwise comparisons. Most of the average differences are significant, except for HSInv -HSIndep and HSInsHSOther, which were expected to produce a similar impact on the bid-ask spread. The largest differences are between HSBanks and HSOther and between HSBanks and HSIns. ownership by banks has a significantly stronger impact on widening spreads than that of other institutions. Independent investment advisors and investment companies have the next greatest impact on spreads, contributing less to widening spreads than banks, but more than other institutions and insurance companies. Apparently, insurance companies with concentrated positions contribute the least to the widening of spreads. This result confirms the statement made earlier in the study that insurance companies have very different investment goals, strategies, and trading patterns than investment companies and independent investment advisors. If investment companies or independent investment advisors obtain a highly concentrated position in each security, then they must possess additional information about the underlying asset. However, it was not expected that banks with concentrated positions would make the strongest contribution to widening of spreads. This surprising result may, possibly, be explained by prudence of bank's investments (i.e., Del Guercio, 1999) or by concentration in a parent firm. If banks obtain a significant holding in one security, they must be sure that this position is a safe and prudent investment.
The results of the empirical analysis provide significant evidence in support of Hypothesis # 4, with the only exception being banks, which surprisingly have the largest positive impact on spreads when there are high levels of concentrated ownership.
Trading Volume (Tests of Hypotheses # 5 and # 6)
This section summarizes results of the tests of the impact of different volume variables on bid-ask spreads. Hypotheses #5 suggests that volume generated by institutions with small positions and individuals is negatively related to the bid-ask spread. Hypothesis #6 proposes that trading volume of institutions with large positions is positively related to spreads. The three volume variables used in all regressions of spreads include: VolLarge -volume generated by institutions with relatively large positions (1% or more of shares outstanding), VolSmall -volume generated by institutions with positions less than 1% of shares outstanding, and VolInd -volume attributable to individual trading, trading of institutions that do not report trades, and offsetting trades by institutions with no net change in shares outstanding during a reporting quarter.
Tables 6-9 provide summaries of the volume variables. Surprisingly, all coefficients are positive, with the volume of small institutions and individuals having a significantly stronger widening impact on bid-ask spreads in all regression models. Only volume generated by large institutions was expected to have a widening impact on spreads. Table 10 (line 2 and 4) summarizes the impact of volume on bid-ask spreads. In all models, volume of small institutions has a slightly stronger effect on spreads than does individual trading volume. The differences, however, are not significant, but they are stronger than the influence of volume of large institutions.
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Empirical analysis does not support Hypothesis # 5. Indeed, the results are contrary to the hypothesized relationship. Hypothesis # 6 is supported with results of the analysis.
Summary and Conclusion
Market perception of information asymmetry is examined by analyzing spreads in relation to ownership and concentration variables for NASDAQ stocks. All of the hypotheses, except #5, were supported by empirical results. Total institutional ownership was found to be inversely related to the bidask spread (Hypotheses #1). Concentration of ownership, measured by the Herfindahl Index, is positively related to spreads (Hypothesis #3). Percentages of institutional ownership by each group of institutions are negatively related to spreads, with independent investment advisors contributing the most to lowering spreads (Hypothesis #2). No evidence was found to support a hypothesis that percentage of shares owned by investment companies had a higher impact on lowering spreads than percentage ownership by banks, insurance companies and other institutions. The findings support the idea that higher levels of dispersed institutional ownership stimulate distribution of information among market participants by increasing exposure of the underlying security, widening analysts' coverage, and providing additional liquidity.
Concentration of ownership by all types of institutions was found to be positively related to spreads, as hypothesized. Investment companies and independent investment advisors with concentrated positions have a significantly stronger impact on widening spreads than do insurance companies and "other" institutions. Concentration by banks, however, unexpectedly exhibited the largest positive impact on widening spreads compared to all other groups of institutions, which provides support to most, but not all of the implications of Hypothesis #4.
Volume of small institutions and individuals was unexpectedly positively related to widening of the spreads with a significantly larger impact than that of the volume generated by institutions with large positions. The results are contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis #5. One explanation may be the fact that it is easier to monitor the largest blockholder, than a large number of smaller, widely-dispersed shareholders. As expected in Hypothesis # 6, volume generated by institutions with large positions (greater than 1% of shares outstanding) is positively related to spread, but as discussed above, the impact is much less significant than that of other two volume variables. * TotalIO is a fraction of shares owned by all institutional investors. HST is the Herfindahl Index -a measure of the concentration of the institutional ownership. Price is the average price during each quarter. StdDailyRet is the standard deviation of daily returns. NumTrades is the average daily number of trades during each quarter. ShrsOut is the average number of shares outstanding during each quarter. NumMktMkrs is the average number of market makers during each quarter. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter. ShrsOut is the average number of shares outstanding during each quarter. NumMktMkrs is the average number of market makers during each quarter. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter. Table 7 Standardized Regressions of the Bid-Ask Spread on the Ownership,
Concentration and Other Predictor Variables
Bid-ask spreads and predictor variables for all NASDAQ-traded stocks are averaged throughout the quarter for each of the 72 quarters (March 1983 and December 2000) . Quarterly averages are used in 72 cross-sectional regressions of the spreads on the institutional ownership, concentration, and other predictor variables. All variables are standardized each quarter, i.e., re-scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Mean is the time-series average coefficient from the 72 quarterly regressions. St. Dev. is the standard deviation of the time series of parameter estimates. The first number in a Pos/Neg column reports the fraction of the 72 regressions with positive parameter estimates followed by the fraction of negative parameter estimates. The first number in the Pos/Neg 10% column contains fractions of the 72 parameter estimates, which are positive and significant at 10% significance level or better followed by the fraction of the negative parameter estimates, which are significant at 10% level or better. Pos. 1/5/10% column contains fractions of the positive parameter estimates, which are significant at 1/5/10% level, respectively. Neg. 1/5/10% column contains fractions of the negative parameter estimates, which are significant at 1/5/10% level, respectively. R 2 is average R 2 from 72 regressions; R 2 -adj is average adjusted R 2 from 72 regressions; number of observations is average number of individual securities in 72 quarterly regressions. NumMktMkrs is the average number of market makers during each quarter. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter. Bid-ask spreads and predictor variables for all NASDAQ-traded stocks are averaged throughout the quarter for each of the 72 quarters (March 1983 and December 2000) . Quarterly averages are used in 72 cross-sectional regressions of the spreads on the institutional ownership, concentration, and other predictor variables. All variables are standardized each quarter, i.e., re-scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Mean is the time-series average coefficient from the 72 quarterly regressions. St. Dev. is the standard deviation of the time series of parameter estimates. The first number in a Pos/Neg column reports the fraction of the 72 regressions with positive parameter estimates followed by the fraction of negative parameter estimates. The first number in the Pos/Neg 10% column contains fractions of the 72 parameter estimates, which are positive and significant at 10% significance level or better followed by the fraction of the negative parameter estimates, which are significant at 10% level or better. Pos. 1/5/10% column contains fractions of the positive parameter estimates, which are significant at 1/5/10% level, respectively. Neg. 1/5/10% column contains fractions of the negative parameter estimates, which are significant at 1/5/10% level, respectively. R 2 is average R 2 from 72 regressions; R 2 -adj is average adjusted R 2 from 72 regressions; number of observations is average number of individual securities in 72 quarterly regressions. HST is the Herfindahl Index -a measure of the concentration of the institutional ownership. Price is the average price during each quarter. StdDailyRet is the standard deviation of daily returns. NumTrades is the average daily number of trades during each quarter. ShrsOut is the average number of shares outstanding during each quarter. NumMktMkrs is the average number of market makers during each quarter. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter. Table 10 Summary of the Relative Impact of Selected Variables on the Bid-Ask Spread.
After obtaining time-series of the parameter estimates from the 72 cross-sectional standardized regressions of the spreads, differences between selected pairs of the parameters were computed. These differences were treated as samples from unknown distributions. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter. VolLarge is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with large positions (greater, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolSmall is the quarterly volume generated by institutional investors with small positions (smaller, than 1% of shares outstanding). VolInd is the quarterly volume generated by individual investors, institutions with positions that do not pass reporting thresholds, and other institutional trades, which are offset within a quarter.
